This paper examines implications from boundedly rational agents models, by investigating the relation between returns following earnings announcements (post-earnings announcement drift) and divergence of opinions among investors. We proxy for divergent opinions with the quantity of volume at the earnings date that is unexpected. Post-announcement returns are increasing in unexpected volume. Our evidence is consistent with Varian (1985) who suggests that opinion divergence may be treated as an additional risk factor affecting asset prices. 
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I. Introduction
Significant space in finance journals has been devoted to providing evidence of empirical patterns inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis. Anomalies associated with momentum or over-reaction in long-term price patterns and under-reaction (and the subsequent drift in the price path) to news events are well documented. 1 In an attempt to explain these phenomena, two types of theoretical models have been developed; those that have agents making irrational choices based on psychological biases, and those that have rational agents acting under constraints.
However, independent tests of these theories are few, perhaps because the models themselves are derived specifically to induce known empirical regularities.
This paper examines implications of boundedly rational agent models by investigating the relation between returns following earnings announcements (post-earnings announcement drift) and divergence of opinions among investors. Our motivation is as follows. First, postearnings announcement drift remains an important puzzle of the sort that these models attempt to explain. In fact, Fama (1998) highlights drift as an established anomaly that is "above suspicion."
Moreover, divergence among investors' opinions has received considerable attention as a theoretical determinant of asset returns (see below). Finally, earnings announcements are particularly good candidates for generating opinion divergence.
2,3
Our tests require a measure of opinion divergence among investors. Consistent with earlier studies of opinion divergence and earnings announcements, we measure opinion 1 DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) , Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) and LaPorta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) all provide evidence of either long-term reversals in returns or abnormal longterm returns and earnings changes. With respect to under-reaction, Ikenberry and Ramnath (1999) provide evidence for stock splits, Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) for tender offers, Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990) for earnings surprises, Seyhun (1998) for public announcements of insider trades, Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995,1999) for seasoned equity and public debt offerings. 2 See Kim and Verrecchia (1994) , Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) and Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) , among others 3 Another way to motivate differential investor interpretations of earnings announcements is to suggest that these events are not completely or uniformly transparent. In support of this contention we note that there is growing empirical evidence to suggest that corporate earnings are actively managed and thus potentially difficult to interpret. For instance, studies by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Toeh, Welch and Wong divergence using investor trading activity at the earnings announcement (e.g. Beaver (1968) , Bamber (1987) , Kandel and Pearson (1995) , Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift (2001) , and many others).
All of these papers link volume to opinion divergence in some fashion. More specifically, our proxy for opinion divergence is the component of volume around the earnings date that is unexpected. In other words, we recognize that volume captures many reasons for trading such as liquidity needs, information content of news, and opinion divergence. 4 Our measures of unexpected volume are designed to isolate the latter.
The use of volume-based proxies for opinion divergence offers important advantages.
First, there is strong evidence that post-earnings announcement drift is concentrated in smaller firms (Bernard and Thomas (1990) ), and we require a proxy for opinion divergence that is available for such firms. Our volume-based measure of opinion divergence is calculable for all actively traded public firms, whereas other typical proxies (such as analyst forecast variability)
are not. 5 Moreover, while there has been much examination of the relation between volume and returns on the earnings announcement date, there has been little analysis of volume's effect on post-earnings announcement returns.
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Our primary result is as follows. Unexpected trading volume at the earnings announcement positively correlates with future returns. In other words, higher opinion divergence at the earnings date is associated with more positive returns during the post-announcement period.
This evidence is consistent with predictions from Varian (1985) , who shows that a mean preserving spread in opinions will most likely lower asset prices, implying positive returns expost. Our results are robust to controls found in the extant drift literature such as earnings surprise, firm size, systematic risk (beta) and total risk (standard deviation of stock returns).
(1998a, 1998b) provide economic evidence of earnings management, implying some accounting statements more accurately reflect the present condition of the firm than do others. 4 See Karpoff (1987) . 5 We discuss the potential selection bias associated with using analyst forecast data below. 6 A notable exception is Bhushan (1994) . Our research question/approach and results differ dramatically from his (see below).
Our evidence also speaks to alternative theories linking opinion divergence with ex-post stock returns. Miller (1977) offers a counterpoint to Varian (1985) by arguing that when opinions diverge, prices reflect the most optimistic assessment, implying returns will be negative ex-post.
Our results are inconsistent with this notion. 7 Hong and Stein (1999) argue that greater heterogeneity in opinions will cause under-reaction to news, implying ex-post returns of the same sign as announcement returns. 8 With respect to our research question, Hong and Stein (1999) suggests that as opinion divergences increases, ex-post returns to positive surprises should be more positive, while ex-post returns to negative surprises should be more negative. To distinguish between Varian (1985) and Hong and Stein (1999) , we conduct supplementary tests by partitioning our data into positive and negative earnings surprises. Our evidence indicates that ex-post returns are increasing in unexpected volume (opinion divergence) for positive earnings surprises. For the sub-sample of negative surprises, ex-post returns continue to increase in unexpected volume. This evidence is inconsistent with Hong and Stein (1999) who would predict that returns following negative events would decrease in opinion divergence.
The separate results for negative earnings surprises also indicate that our study is somewhat atypical of post-earnings announcement drift papers. Specifically, traditional drift studies seek to explain the negative returns that follow negative surprises. We show that opinion divergence positively affects returns that follow negative surprises. In other words, we recognize that we cannot fully explain the phenomenon of post-earnings announcement drift as it is typically characterized (ex-post returns in the direction of the original surprise). 9 Rather, we use the study of returns following earnings announcements as the crucible upon which to test implications from bounded rationality models of investor behavior. 7 We note, however, in the presence of short selling constraints and continuously arriving new information, our results may be seen as consistant with Miller's model if the new information increases divergence of opinion. 8 Hong and Stein also model how the same market can generate over-reaction to information. This aspect of their model is not the focus of our paper.
Our work extends the literature relating volume and opinion divergence. Kandel and Pearson (1995 ), Bamber, Barron and Stober (1997 and Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift (2001) all document evidence suggesting earnings announcement volume is partially driven by opinion divergence. 10 Our contribution is to empirically control for other likely sources of volume such as liquidity needs (Benston and Hagerman (1974) , Branch and Freed (1977) , Petersen and Fialkowski (1994) ) and information effects (Karpoff (1987) and Chordia and Swaminathan (2000)). We find that unexpected volume carries incremental explanatory power for returns beyond prior (typical) trading volume and total earnings announcement volume. Moreover, the effect of unexpected volume on post-event returns is positive, while prior year volume negatively affects ex-post returns, and total earnings event volume has no significant effect. Apparently, volume is comprised of several components that imply different effects on ex-post returns.
These findings also add to the extensive literature linking volume and returns. Chordia with the notion that volume indicates liquidity and therefore variation in it proxies for the risk of reductions in liquidity. The varied conclusions of these works suggest the importance of separating volume into components that reflect different motives for trading. However, all of these papers focus on total trading activity. By contrast, our results indicate that at least around earnings events, different components of volume have different effects on ex-post returns.
9 Nevertheless, for the full sample, we continue to see that ex-post returns generally follow the signed magnitude of the earnings surprise (see table IV below), consistent with the extant drift literature. 10 These results are consistent with the theoretical work by Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) and Kim and Verrecchia (1994) .
Finally, we speak to the literature investigating opinion divergence and stock returns.
While our results are most consistent with the theoretical predictions of Varian (1985) , they are predicated on the power of unexplained volume to proxy for opinion divergence. Another possible proxy for divergent opinions, variability in analysts' forecasts, has also been linked to ex-post returns (see Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) ). They find that greater forecast variability (which they interpret to proxy more divergent opinions) negatively correlates with future returns. This is inconsistent with Varian (1985) and consistent with Miller (1977) .
To reconcile these two seemingly contradictory findings, the appendix explores the relationship between analyst forecast variability and post-earnings announcement returns.
Unfortunately, use of this measure excludes a preponderance of small firms, which are crucial to any study of drift. To better understand the sample selection bias associated with the use of analyst data, we apply the approach advocated in Heckman (1979) to the joint analysis of analyst coverage and the relation between volume-based measures of opinion divergence and postearnings announcement returns. The results confirm the existence of selection bias, casting doubt on conclusions about the effects of forecast variability on return anomalies typically associated with small firms.
The remainder of this research is organized as follows. Section II discusses the placement of our work in the context of research on post-earnings announcement drift, and on trading activity around earnings announcements. Section III presents our data. Section IV describes our methods of proxy measurement. Section V contains results and section VI concludes.
II. Prior Literature
A. Post-Earnings Announcement Drift
The literature on post-earnings announcement drift is extensive. Beginning with Ball's (1968) documentation of the phenomenon, countless papers attempt to explain the basic result that positive (negative) earnings surprises are followed by significant abnormal positive (negative) returns over the following three months. Subsequent research highlights the robustness of this result after controlling for changes in risk (Bernard and Thomas (1989) ), potential flaws in research design (Bernard and Thomas (1989) ), and the incomplete adjustment of forecasts by analysts (Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) ).
A common result documented in prior work is that drift is concentrated among smaller firms, implying potential selection bias concerns in tests that require data typically available only for larger firms. The importance of firm size to the drift phenomenon is addressed specifically by Bhushan (1994) . He shows that the concentration of drift among these firms is likely associated with the difficulty they present in trading to take advantage of the mispricing. In other words, transaction costs are higher for smaller firms and this drives the sensitivity of drift to firm size.
He controls for transaction costs through share price and previous trading volume, with higher share prices and volumes indicating lower costs. The inclusion of these controls dissipates the effect of firm size on drift.
Our work also focuses on the effects of volume on drift. However, our research question, our approach and our results differ markedly from Bhushan's. First, we use drift as a window through which to view the relationship between opinion divergence and returns. In particular, earnings announcements are associated with anomalous return patterns (Fama (1998) ) and they may engender divergent opinions (Kim and Verrecchia (1994) Barron and Stober (1997, 1999) , and Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift (2001) . Generally, these studies find that volume is higher around earnings events that are more likely associated with more divergent investor opinions. Fleming and Remolona (1999) Trading may also be larger when the news in the earnings announcement is bigger (see Karpoff (1987) ). Third, more trading may indicate more divergent opinions about the implications of the earnings news. Our volume-based proxies for opinion divergence attempt to control for the first two possible sources of volume and treat the remainder as an indicator of divergent opinions.
III. Data
Our primary sample meets the following criteria. From COMPUSTAT we require earnings announcements between January 1980 and July 1998 by NYSE/AMEX firms with at least 10 quarters of primary earnings per share, excluding extraordinary items, adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends. We exclude NASDAQ stocks for comparability -drift papers typically focus on only NYSE/AMEX stocks. These data are split into two periods: a pre-period for measuring the variability of earnings surprises (1980:1 through 1984:4), and a measurement period (1985:1 through the latest earnings announcement). We require at least eight quarters of data from the pre-period to estimate variability in earnings, which we use later in our estimation of earnings surprise (see below).
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All stock return data are from the Center for Research in Securities Prices at the University of Chicago (CRSP). We also calculate the market capitalization decile for each firm prior to every earnings announcement. The decile ranking is based on the market value of equity of the firm at the beginning of the calendar year in which the earnings are announced. The size portfolio values range from 1 (for firms whose market cap measures within the smallest decile of capitalization rankings of NYSE/AMEX firms in the previous year) to 10 (for the largest firms).
We collect information on the number of shares traded in the security over the two-day earnings announcement window (COMPUSTAT date and preceding day), 13 and during a 50-day control period preceding it ([t-54, t-5] where t is the COMPUSTAT earnings date). Aggregate market volume (NYSE/AMEX stocks) is also collected over these periods, as is the number of shares outstanding for the announcing firm and the market. These data are used to calculate volume measures resembling those found in Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift (2001) , discussed more fully below. Finally, we obtain volume over the full fiscal year previous to the earnings event and shares outstanding at the end of said year to calculate a measure of the average turnover in 12 Our data collection approach mirrors that of prior papers examining drift (see e.g. Foster, Olsen and Shevlin (1984) and Bernard and Thomas (1989) ), to enhance comparability. the stock. Our primary sample consists of 44,755 earnings announcement events with sufficient data to calculate volume measures, post-announcement returns, and earnings surprise proxies.
We describe calculations of our metrics next.
IV. Variable Construction
In this section, we describe methods for variable construction. First, we require a measure of earnings surprise comparable to that used in past studies of drift. We describe it in section A.
We describe calculation of volume-based proxies for opinion divergence in section B. Section C describes our drift calculation approach. Section D contains descriptive statistics.
A. Measuring the Earnings Surprise
We define a seasonal random walk in unexpected earnings for firm i in quarter t as:
Using data from the pre-period (1980:1 through 1984:4), we estimate the variability of earnings surprises as the standard deviation of SRWUE i,t (hereafter referred to as SD i ) calculated over a minimum of eight and a maximum of 20 quarters. During the measurement period (1985:1 through latest earnings announcement), we calculate the standardized unexpected earnings (SUE)
for each firm quarter's earnings announcement i,t as:
Finally, in each quarter of the measurement period, SUE values are used to form 10 portfolios based on the decile ranks of SUEs from the previous quarter. The largest positive (negative) SUEs are assigned a portfolio ranking of 10 (one). We label this earnings surprise ranking SUE pf . 
B. Measures of Unexpected Volume -Proxies for Opinion Divergence
We construct two different measures of unexpected volume as our proxies for opinion divergence. 15 Both measures are assigned a portfolio (decile) ranking, using exactly the same approach as described above for SUE pf (the portfolio decile ranking of SUE). We rank volume measures based on prior quarter decile cut-off values because we utilize data over a fairly long window (1985 through 1998) in our analysis. If there are secular changes in the level of any of our volume variables 16 , or if there are changes in the market reaction based on the levels over time, use of unranked volume measures could add noise to the measured correlations between these volume measures and drift. Portfolio ranked volume measures are always denoted with a subscript pf. We describe our two measures of unexpected volume separately.
Change in Total Turnover Calculation
We begin with Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift's (2001) measure of total volume at an earnings announcement which they label market adjusted turnover (TO). Applying their approach to our data implies the following:
where Vol i,t is the announcing firm's volume on day t (t=0 is the COMPUSTAT earnings date) and Shs i,t is firm i's shares outstanding on day t. However, stocks with relatively higher turnover at the earnings announcement may reasonably be the same stocks with relatively higher turnover 14 Again, see Foster, Olsen and Shevlin (1984) and Bernard and Thomas (1989) . 15 A possible alternative proxy for heterogeneous opinions is variability in analysts' forecasts. Unfortunately, analyst forecast data is only available for a sub-sample of firms, typically larger ones, while post-earnings announcement drift is generally viewed as a small firm phenomenon. Moreover, work by Scherbina (2001), among others, highlights significant biases in measures of forecast variability, which have implications for the relation between such measures and ex-post returns. Our appendix presents evidence consistent with selection bias effects to using analyst-followed firms, as well as results in line with Scherbina (2001) and Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) . 16 Certainly, we know that aggregate volume was much higher during the latter part of our sample period. 
overall (i.e. more liquid stocks). In other words, TO may capture more than just volume attributable to divergent opinions, it can also include liquidity trading.
Our controls for the liquidity aspect of trading volume take two forms. First, we recognize that a typical amount of trading occurs in the market, even without earnings news. We therefore subtract typical trading volume over a non-announcement period, from earnings announcement volume. Specifically, we adjust the earnings event turnover measure in equation (3) by subtracting market-adjusted turnover over a pre-earnings announcement period [t-54, t-5] (t is the earnings event date). We label this change in market adjusted turnover ∆TO, and the portfolio ranked version of it (∆TO) 
A large market microstructure literature supports our approach by highlighting the role of volume as a determinant of liquidity. Moreover, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) show that liquidity is a key determinant of returns in general, implying a need to control for it if we wish to isolate the relationship between ex-post returns and volume-based proxies for opinion divergence.
Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) illustrate that liquidity concerns are pronounced around earnings events. Finally, more recent work by Ahmed, Schneible and Stevens (2001) suggests that the liquidity effects of online trading are important to the market's reaction to earnings announcements.
Our second liquidity control is motivated by the work of Bhushan (1994) who shows that volume affects the sensitivity of post-earnings announcement returns to earnings surprise proxies.
In order to illustrate that we are not simply measuring this effect, we include past annual turnover as a control variable in our primary tests. We calculate this control as total volume during the fiscal year preceding the earnings event, divided by shares outstanding at the end of that fiscal year. The portfolio ranked version of past annual turnover is labeled (TO yr-1 ) pf.
Standardized Unexpected Volume (SUV) Calculation
As discussed above, Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) describe an informedness effect wherein volume may be related to price moves. 17 Simply scaling by non-announcement volume, as in equation (4), assumes similar price moves during the announcement and control windows.
Thus, to the extent that earnings announcements convey new information, (∆TO) pf may proxy for both an informedness effect and a consensus effect.
Our alternative measure of unexpected volume is designed to control for both the liquidity effect and informedness effect in volume. 18 Similar to Crabbe and Post (1994) , we estimate the volume attributable to differences of opinion using a methodology that mirrors the market model approach to estimating abnormal returns. Specifically, we construct a measure of Standardized Unexpected Volume (SUV), calculated as a standardized prediction error from a univariate model of trading volume on the absolute value of returns for the j th earnings announcement made by firm i.
where
and, 17 The evidence in Karpoff (1987) is broadly consistent with this. 18 The residual is designed to capture opinion divergence. 19 Again, to control for time-inconsistencies in the interpretation of volume, our tests link postannouncement returns with the portfolio ranked version of SUV (labeled SUV pf ). Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel and Pearson (1995) note, volume should be positively related to price changes, independent of their direction.
If volume is linearly related to the absolute value of returns, the intercept from the regression captures average volume uncorrelated with price moves during the estimation window.
Therefore, subtracting α in equation (6) is isomorphic to the liquidity trading adjustment in equation (4). In addition, subtracting j , i R ⋅ β in (6) controls for the informedness effect of Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) . We interpret SUV (and its portfolio ranking SUV pf ) in a manner consistent with the discussion above: greater than anticipated volume at the earnings announcement implies greater divergence of opinion about firm value at that time.
C. Measuring Drift
To maintain comparability with past studies, drift is calculated in a manner identical to that used by Foster, Olson and Shevlin (1984) and Bernard and Thomas (1989) . Specifically, for each earnings event we cumulate the firm's size-adjusted return over a 60 trading day window following the announcement. The daily size-adjusted return is calculated as the daily difference between the firm's equity return and a benchmark portfolio return based on NYSE/AMEX market capitalization deciles. In our robustness checks, we use market-adjusted returns, with a valueweighted market index return, as our dependent variable. The mean estimates in Table I 
D. Descriptive Statistics
V. Results
Our results are presented as follows. Main findings are in sections A (univariate) and B (multivariate). All robustness checks and specification changes are discussed in section C. Table III (1985)). Consistent with prior work, we find that post-earnings announcement returns are increasing in earnings surprise (SUE pf ) and decreasing in firm size (MV pf ). The coefficients on these variables are significantly different from zero with 99% confidence across all specifications.
A. Univariate Results
B. Multivariate Results
We also document evidence consistent with Bhushan ( Turning to our analysis of the effects of opinion divergence on returns, we see that unexpected volume (both ∆TO pf and SUV pf ) positively influences post-announcement returns with 99% confidence. This contrasts with both the negative effect of past volume (liquidity) and the lack of significant effects of total volume on ex-post returns. Clearly there are differences in the effects of prior volume, earnings announcement volume in total, and unexpected volume on post-earnings announcement returns.
In sum, our multivariate results mirror the univariate results presented above. Postannouncement returns are increasing in proxies for opinion divergence around earnings announcements, consistent with Varian (1985) . The regression itself is significant, with F-statistics varying between 97.4 and 160. The adjusted R 2 s are in line with those found in other studies that employ regressions to study drift (e.g. Bhushan (1994)).
C. Alternative Specifications and Robustness
We are not the first paper to examine the effects of volume on the phenomenon known as post-earnings announcement drift. Bhushan (1994) uses prior year volume to inversely proxy for transactions costs (or directly proxy for liquidity) and finds that more liquid stocks are associated with less drift. However, he specifies the effect of volume differently than we do. Specifically, Bhushan interacts past trading volume with earnings surprise and finds that the sensitivity of drift to earnings surprise is substantially weaker for higher volume stocks (negative coefficient on the volume*surprise interactive). He interprets this result as consistent with the hypothesis that stocks with higher transaction costs (lower volume stocks) have more drift because those costs make it more difficult to bring prices in line with fundamental value.
To enhance comparability with Bhushan's work, we examine whether our results persist using a specification more closely aligned with his. 
VI. Conclusions
The phenomenon of post-earnings announcement drift has been well-explored by accounting and finance academics. Attempts to explain it as compensation for risk have generally been less than completely successful. However, recent work by Varian (1985) advocates viewing divergence of investors' opinions as a risk factor that may be priced. We explore whether opinion divergence carries explanatory power for post-earnings announcement returns.
We proxy for opinion divergence with measures of unexpected volume. We find that post-earnings announcement returns are increasing in unexpected volume, while they are decreasing in prior year turnover (a proxy for liquidity) and unrelated to total earnings announcement trading activity. In other words, unexpected volume differs from total trading activity, both in construction and in implication for ex-post returns. Our results are consistent with the joint hypothesis that unexpected volume proxies for opinion divergence (see Kandel and Pearson (1995) ), and is treated as an additional risk proxy requiring compensation (see Varian (1985) ).
Our results are robust to the inclusion of standard risk proxies in our regressions. Thus, it appears that opinion divergence, as proxied by unexpected volume, is not simply a well-known risk factor in different guise. This again suggests that opinion divergence be viewed as an additional risk proxy. Finally, we believe that future work developing and verifying proxies for opinion divergence would be fruitful.
Table I Descriptive Statistics
Sample is 44,755 earnings announcements from 1985:1 through July 1998 by NYSE/AMEX firms with sufficient data to calculate portfolio rankings of: standardized unexplained earnings (SUE), standardized unexpected volume (SUV), the difference in market adjusted turnover (∆TO) between the control period [t-54, t-5] and earnings date (day t), variability in analysts' forecasts (SDF), and change in forecast variability (∆SDF). Portfolio rankings are cardinal rankings from 1 to 10 of this quarter's variable value, based on which decile of the previous quarter variable decile rankings it falls in. Table presents the means of variables, categorized by SUE pf . SUE is standardized unexplained earnings. SUE it = SRWUE it /SD i . SRWUE it = EPS it -EPS it-4 . SD i is the time series standard deviation of SRWUE over the quarters from [1980:1, 1984:4] , with available data. Drift is the cumulated size adjusted return over the trading days window [t+1, t+60] , where day t is the earnings announcement date. Market Value (MV) is the market value of equity in thousands, at the end of the year preceding the earnings announcement. Market adjusted turnover (TO) is firm volume over the earnings announcement window divided by shares outstanding, minus a similarly calculated measure averaged over all NYSE/AMEX firms. Change in market adjusted turnover (∆TO) is TO minus a similarly calculated measure over the window [t-55, t-6] Sample is 44,755 earnings announcements from 1985:1 through July 1998 by NYSE/AMEX firms with sufficient data to calculate portfolio rankings (indicated with pf subscript) of following variables: Market Value (MV) is the market capitalization in thousands, at the end of the year preceding the earnings announcement; Market adjusted turnover (TO eannc ) is firm volume over the earnings announcement window divided by shares outstanding, minus a similarly calculated measure averaged over all NYSE/AMEX firms; Change in market adjusted turnover (∆TO) is TO eannc minus a similarly calculated measure over the window [t-54, t-5] where t is the earnings announcement date; Prior year turnover (TO yr-1 ) is total volume over the firm's previous fiscal year divided by shares outstanding at the end of that year; Standardized unexpected volume (SUV) is the scaled (by estimation window standard deviation of prediction errors) 2-day prediction error from a market model-style regression of volume on absolute valued returns; SUE is standardized unexplained earnings. SUE it = SRWUE it /SD i . SRWUE it = EPS it -EPS it-4 . SD i is the time series standard deviation of SRWUE over the quarters from [1980:1, 1984:4] , with available data. Tstatistics (in parentheses) are calculated using White's heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. a,b,c indicates significant at 10%, 5%, 1% levels. Table presents regressions of percent Drift (the cumulated size adjusted percent return over the trading days window [t+1, t+60] , where day t is the earnings announcement date) on earnings surprise (SUE pf ), market capitalization (MV pf ), volume measures, and SUE pf interacted with market capitalization and volume measures. Sample is 44,755 earnings announcements from 1985:1 through July 1998 with sufficient information to calculate all variables. Volume measures are: (TO yr-1 ) pf (prior fiscal year turnover in the stock), SUV (standardized unexpected volume) or Change in market adjusted turnover (∆TO). Prior year turnover is total volume over the firm's previous fiscal year scaled by shares outstanding at the end of that fiscal year. Market adjusted turnover (TO) is firm volume over the earnings announcement window divided by shares outstanding, minus a similarly calculated measure averaged over all NYSE/AMEX firms; and ∆TO is TO minus a similarly calculated measure over the window [t-54, t-5] where t is the earnings announcement date. Standardized unexpected volume (SUV) is the scaled (by estimation window standard deviation of prediction errors) 2-day prediction error from a market model-style regression of volume on absolute valued returns; SUE is standardized unexplained earnings. SUE it = SRWUE it /SD i . SRWUE it = EPS it -EPS it-4 . SD i is the time series standard deviation of SRWUE over the quarters from [1980:1, 1984:4] , with available data. T-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using White's heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. a,b,c indicates significant at 10%, 5%, 1% levels. 
A.I. Data
Analyst forecast data come from I/B/E/S. Unfortunately, there is a problem with the standard, market purchased I/B/E/S data, which is described in Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) . Briefly, I/B/E/S adjusts forecasts for splits and stock dividends to enhance comparability through time. However, these adjusted values are rounded to the nearest penny, creating the possibility of truncated data problems, especially among stocks with a large number of splits. To the extent that firms with more splits are systematically different from those with few or no splits, measures of forecast variability across the two groups will differ due to data construction. To avoid such complications, we use unadjusted forecast data provided by I/B/E/S at our request.
A.II. Analyst Forecast Based Proxies for Opinion Divergence
The proxies we use for analyst dispersion of opinion are common to the accounting literature. Prior to the earnings announcement, we calculate the standard deviation across analysts of their forecasts for annual earnings per share, deflated by the absolute value of the across-analysts mean forecast. We label this variable SDF and rank each earnings announcement's SDF into a decile portfolio following the approach described earlier. We require that these forecasts be no more than 45 days before the earnings announcement and there must be at least three forecasts available to be included in the sample (see Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift (2001)). Finally, we ignore forecasts just prior to the fiscal year-end earnings announcement (again consistent with Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift), since we will also be interested in forecast variability after the event, and forecasts of annual earnings after the year-end announcement would necessarily be of next year's earnings.
Our second proxy for analyst opinion divergence is the change in analyst forecast variability for a window around the earnings event. Specifically, we subtract SDF, calculated as described above, from a similarly calculated measure using (at least three) forecasts post-earnings announcement, but within 30 days (again, see Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift (2001)). This change in opinion divergence is labeled ∆SDF, and we place each estimate into ranked decile portfolios.
Data constraints limit this sample to only 8,947 observations that have both analyst opinion divergence measures.
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The simple correlation between volume and analyst-based proxies for opinion divergence is not terribly strong. Pre-earnings announcement forecast variability (SDF pf ) is unrelated to SUV pf and negatively related to ∆TO pf with 90% confidence. The change in forecast variability (∆SDF pf ) is negatively related to SUVpf and positively related to ∆TO pf with 90% confidence.
The lack of a consistent directional relationship suggests that when both types of proxies are available, they capture different effects. 24 Henceforth, we will typically refer to a firm or announcement as having analyst following if SDF and ∆SDF are non-missing. Our requirement of at least three analysts to calculate SDF and ∆SDF implies that some firms with little analyst following (one or two analysts) are labeled as having none. We simply wish to imply a difference between little to no analyst coverage and greater coverage.
A.III. Post-earnings announcement Returns and Forecast Dispersion
The obvious interpretation of this evidence is that returns are declining in opinion divergence. This interpretation is in direct contrast to the one when we employed volume-based measures of opinion divergence. It is also consistent with the results in Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) , and the biases discussed in Scherbina (2001). We also see that there is a nonpositive relation between post-announcement returns and our unexpected volume proxies, among firms with sufficient analyst following to calculate forecast dispersion. This too is in contrast to the evidence presented in table IV. Obviously, there is something different between the samples of earnings announcements with and without analyst following. We examine this difference below.
A.IV. Differential Effects of Unexpected Volume on Drift for Followed versus NonFollowed Firms
What could explain the declining significance of unexpected volume for drift among analyst followed firms? It does not appear to be caused by analyst-based proxies usurping the explanatory power of volume-based proxies. If we include in our sample only those observations with analyst data, then volume-based proxies are insignificant determinants of drift, regardless of whether we include or exclude the forecast dispersion measures. An alternative explanation is that there is selection bias in the use of analyst data, as small firms are less likely to be followed and drift is a small-firm phenomenon. Our tests below attempt to control for this by employing the Heckman (1979) procedure. A third possibility is that volume-based proxies work well when analyst data is unavailable (for example among smaller firms), and work poorly at other times. If availability of analyst data implies volume carries a different meaning, then the sensitivity of drift to unexpected volume will differ for analyst-followed versus other firms.
We regress post-announcement returns on SUE pf , MV pf and unexpected volume, as well as interactives of these variables. The interactives are created by multiplying the usual explanatory variables by the indicator "Analyst", which takes the value of one if the earnings announcement is associated with sufficient analyst following to calculate SDF and ∆SDF, zero otherwise. However, we cannot run such regressions in isolation, because of potential selection bias. To control for this, we estimate the regressions using Heckman's (1979) two-step selection corrected procedure.
The first step in the two-stage Heckman is a probit of the dummy variable for significant analyst coverage on firm size, prior year turnover (both in pf ranked form) and one-digit industry dummies. We adopt this simplified structure to maximize the number of observations in our probit (and hence in the second pass regression), and because Hong, Lim, Stein (2000) show that the key determinant of analyst following is firm size. 25 The results indicate that analyst following is more likely for larger firms with greater prior year turnover. Industry dummies are insignificant. The second step regression includes the inverse Mills ratio from the first step probit. T-statistics are calculated using White's heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
26
The results are presented in table AII.
First we see that the sensitivity of ex-post returns to earnings surprise (SUE pf ) is significantly more negative when the firm is analyst followed. Analysts appear to help accelerate the incorporation of news into prices, leading to less under-reaction at announcement, and a less positive correlation between surprise and post-announcement returns. This interpretation is in line with evidence reported in Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) . In other words, analyst coverage appears to change the information environment, and we must be cognizant of this as it could affect the sensitivity of ex-post returns to unexpected volume. We also find that selection bias is a particular concern in this sample. The coefficients on the inverse Mills ratio and its interactive with the analyst following indicator are always significant. This makes interpretations of OLS results based on this sample, potentially unreliable. It also raises concerns with sampling strictly on analyst-followed firms in studies of anomalies that are particular to small firms.
Finally, unexpected volume may have a differential effect on post-announcement returns when the firm is analyst followed as opposed to when it is not. Specifically, returns are increasing in unexpected volume when the firm has little analyst following, while the relation between unexpected volume (∆TO pf ) and returns is significantly smaller if the firm has greater analyst following. 27 For the low (no)-analyst following sample, this is consistent with the joint hypothesis that unexpected volume proxies for opinion divergence and investors treat this as a risk factor (a la Varian (1985) ). For the high-analyst following sample, our results are in line with Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) who show that analyst coverage changes the information environment. In this new environment, with additional sources of information (analyst coverage), volume may carry less information for post-earnings announcement returns. This evidence is also consistent with Goetzmann and Massa (2001) wherein trading variable proxies for opinion divergence explain ex-post returns when other factors do not. [1980:1, 1984:4] , with available data. Analyst is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is followed by at least three (3) analysts just before and just after the earnings event, and the earnings event is not at the fiscal year-end. λ is the inverse Mills ratio from probit. T-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using White's heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. a,b,c indicates significant at 10%, 5%, 1% levels. 
